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I. INTRODUCTION
The interchange fees set by the major credit card associations are among
the most frequently paid prices in modern economies but are largely 
invisible to consumers. Does Adam Smith’s invisible hand ensure that these
invisible prices are set at economically efficient levels? Or should public
policy concern itself with how interchange fees are set? If so, should policy
stipulate their levels by regulation, or is the application of competition 
policy a better approach?
In this paper, I will outline why the interchange fee question should be
of public policy concern. I will then discuss whether competition policy
approaches to its solution are preferable to more regulatory intervention.
This is an open question, and in the United Kingdom and at EC level,
there are cases currently under consideration, on which I will make some
general comments. But let us begin with the factual background for the
United Kingdom and Europe generally.
II. THE SIZE OF CREDIT CARD SPENDING AND DEBT
The United Kingdom accounts for the bulk of credit card spending and
debt in Europe. In 2003, there were estimated to be 66.8 million cards in
issue in the United Kingdom, about 1.4 per adult, an increase of 60 per-
cent on four years earlier. There were about 1.8 billion credit card transac-
tions—and so many direct occurrences of the invisible price—with a trans-
action value of £107.9 billion, a figure 50 percent up on four years before.
1
Credit card transaction value is almost 10 percent of U.K. gross domestic
product and is about 15 percent of consumer expenditure.
2 At the end of
2004, U.K. credit card debt outstanding was nearly £55 billion, also up
more than 40 percent over four years, which is about a third of unsecured
debt owed by individuals.
3
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 Credit card usage is far higher in the United Kingdom than elsewhere in
Europe. Indeed, the United Kingdom has accounted for more than 75 per-
cent of credit card spending in western Europe in recent years. By contrast,
France and Germany each account for less than 1.5 percent. The largest
users apart from the United Kingdom are Italy and Spain, with shares of
about 4.5 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively.
4
The striking difference between the United Kingdom and the rest of
Europe is not primarily because continentals tend not to pay with plastic.
They do, but predominantly with immediate debit cards and also with
charge cards and deferred debit cards, particularly in France. In the United
Kingdom, spending with credit cards is not much lower than with debit
cards, and there are more credit cards in issue than debit cards. Payment
cards (credit, charge, and debit cards) are used by U.K. consumers as much
as cash and checks in terms of value.
III. SOME ECONOMICS OF FOUR-PARTY CREDIT CARD SYSTEMS
A simplified account of how credit card systems operate is as follows.
Most credit card transactions involve four parties:
• the cardholder, who receives payment services
5 and credit services from 
• the bank that issued the card (the issuer), and
• the retailer, who receives payment services from 
• the bank that deals with the retailer (the acquirer).
When the customer uses the card to buy from the retailer, which must
honor all cards of the types it accepts, according to the rules of schemes such
as those of MasterCard and Visa, the retailer receives from the acquirer the
retail price less the merchant service charge (MSC). The issuer pays the
acquirer the retail price minus-or-plus any interchange fee. In practice, 
credit card associations set interchange fees that go from acquirer to issuer,
but in principle, they could go either way or be zero. (In what follows, a
“higher” interchange fee will mean a more positive or less negative fee from
acquirer to issuer.) As well as the interchange fee from the acquirer, the
issuer receives from the customer repayments, any annual fee, interest 
payments on debt outstanding, late payment fees, etc., and might, on the
other hand, give the customer rebates, loyalty rewards, and the like. 
Interchange fees are generally equal to the fallback rate set at a system
level.
6 The two largest systems—Visa and MasterCard
7—have many 
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 members in common. The systems serve the two sides of the market—
cardholders and retailers—in which a key intermediate price in effect has
been set collectively by member banks. 
An indication of the level of U.K. interchange fees is that when the
Cruickshank report was published in March 2000, the average fallback rate
for both the MasterCard and Visa schemes in the United Kingdom stood
at 1.1 percent.
8 Current domestic U.K. fallback interchange fee levels are
not in the public domain, but for cross-border transactions in Europe,
MasterCard’s enhanced electronic rate is 0.95 percent and Visa’s electronic
authorization rate is 0.70 percent.
9
A. Commercial incentives and the interchange fee 
What economic factors influence commercial incentives and the public
interest in regard to the level of the interchange fee? A substantial economic
literature has examined these questions, of which leading examples are the
papers by Katz (2001), Rochet and Tirole (2002), and Wright (2004), and
the book by Evans and Schmalensee (1999).
A baseline proposition is the neutrality result that the level of the inter-
change fee makes no difference in special theoretical circumstances, name-
ly if:
• retailers could freely and costlessly charge different retail prices
according to method of payment, and
• issuers costlessly could, and would, rebate higher interchange fee 
revenue to cardholders.
Then different interchange fees would lead to correspondingly different
retail surcharges for card use, leaving the underlying equilibrium
unchanged. What cardholders paid as higher surcharges, they would
receive back as higher rebates, leaving net prices the same. The interchange
fee would not matter for practical purposes, and no one would have reason
to care about its level. What one paid on the swings one would receive back
on the roundabout.
In fact, differential pricing is costly or unattractive for the great majori-
ty of retailers, and where schemes impose no-surcharge rules, it is disal-
lowed anyway.
10 In the absence of surcharging, card-accepting retailers
must take account of the MSC in setting their prices generally. Via the
MSC, the level of the interchange fee is important. A higher interchange
fee then will increase the retailer’s prices to all customers, whether or not
they pay by the credit card at issue. Payers by the card may get some or all
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of the higher interchange fee back as a rebate (or lower card transaction
charges), but other payers won’t. The incentive to have and use the card
will shift with the interchange fee.
Moreover, if rebates to cardholders move less than one-for-one with the
interchange fee, raising the interchange fee will tend to increase the aggregate
profit of the banks. In that case, the banks would have a natural commercial
incentive to achieve and maintain high interchange fees. One reason why
higher interchange fees might not be rebated 100 percent to cardholders is
that the issuing market might be expected to be imperfectly competitive, and
less competitive than the acquiring market, given that issuing services are
characterized by extensive product differentiation and the buyers (cardhold-
ers) are individuals, many of whom have proportionately high search and
switching costs (compared with those of many retailers). Moreover, there
may be stickiness in giving rebates, as distinct from lower annual fees, to
cardholders. And once the annual fee is down to zero, which it commonly is
in the United Kingdom for example, such competition as there is may tend
to take less direct forms than price. (If what comes through my mailbox is a
guide, it would indeed seem to.)
Rochet and Tirole (2002) indeed assume, in view of the facts of the
industry, that member banks’ profits increase with the interchange fee. So
their incentive is to set the interchange fee at “the highest level that is con-
sistent with merchants accepting the card” (p. 558).
In considering the incentive of retailers to accept cards, it is crucial to 
distinguish, as Rochet and Tirole stress, between a retailer’s individual
incentive and that of retailers collectively. Especially in a number of lines of
retail, it would be substantially detrimental to a retailer’s business not to
accept at least the cards of the two main schemes, above all because the
retailer would otherwise risk losing profitable business to rival retailers.
11 In
short, there is an element of must-take. Because of the competitive external-
ity between retailers, the extent of card acceptance by retailers is certainly
not a reliable measure of overall retailer benefit from, or of the economic
welfare of, card acceptance in respect of systems with wide coverage.
A further factor that influences the degree to which retailers must take
cards is the cost/reward structure faced by users. If the interchange fee is so
high that competition among issuers leads to users getting rewards for card
usage (for example, air miles or cash back), “the cardholder is then even
more upset when a shop turns down a card, as she loses the reward on top
of the convenience benefit” (Rochet and Tirole, 2002, p. 560). This rein-
forces the key point that individual retailers’ willingness to accept cards is
 not a good measure of overall retailer (or social) benefit from card accept-
ance. The sum of the willingness of each retailer to accept can greatly
exceed the aggregate benefit to retailers or to economic welfare generally.
12
Moreover, the cost and reward structure faced by users can distort choice
between payments systems—to the detriment of economic efficiency. The
governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia has recently drawn parallels
between circumstances with high interchange fees and Gresham’s law that
bad money drives good money out of circulation.
13 Just as our sixteenth
century forbears would rather pay with a coin that had lost 1 percent of its
gold than a full one, so in the twenty-first century, some of us may be
tempted to pay by means that yield 1 percent rewards at the expense of the
retailer than by ways that do not. Without pushing the analogy too far, the
common point is that the high-cost means of payment (for the retailer) can
tend to gain at the expense of the low-cost means—irrespective of any
underlying efficiency advantage.
Might more purchasing with credit cards, perhaps encouraged by card-
holder rewards resulting from high interchange fees, nevertheless expand
overall consumption, and hence economic activity? This seems doubtful.
First, the expansion in sales for one retailer deciding to accept a card is not
an aggregate demand expansion if others lose sales in consequence. Second,
if (as we naturally assume, in view of our conference host) the central bank
is conducting monetary policy to keep aggregate demand in line with the
economy’s supply capacity, household consumption can expand only if
business investment or government expenditure or net exports decrease
correspondingly. The interchange fee could conceivably affect the mix of
demand, but aggregate demand remains constrained by supply capacity.
14
Finally, in considering the incentives of the banks with respect to the
level of the interchange fee, it is important to keep in mind that, as well as
revenues related to interchange fees and any annual fees, issuers receive
very substantial revenues from those with credit card debt outstanding.
15
Credit card spending, unlike most other forms of payment, leads directly
to debt, which is typically relatively expensive for the many who do not
clear their balances in full within the interest-free period.
16 Of course, irre-
spective of the means of payment it uses, the change in a household’s net
indebtedness in any period is equal to its expenditure (including interest
payments) less its income (including interest income). But means of pay-
ment can nevertheless influence the evolution of the mix of the household’s
net liability position. In particular, it is natural to expect that encourage-
ment (for example, via the interchange fee) of means of payment that are
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tend to increase such debt. If that debt is relatively profitable for those with
a role in setting the interchange fee, then the direct link from credit card
spending to credit card debt will be an (upward) influence in setting the
commercially most advantageous interchange fee.
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE INTERCHANGE FEE
What, then, determines the interchange fee that would best serve the
public interest? This question does not have a simple general answer.
17 For
example, as explained below, there is no presumption that the public inter-
est would be best served by an interchange fee of zero.
18 Three factors with
a potential bearing on the interchange fee that is in the public interest are
network externalities, imperfect competition in card issuing (or acquiring),
and the nature of retailer competition and pricing—in particular, the ease
or difficulty of surcharging for card use.
The observation was made earlier that the major credit card associations
serve two sides of a market—cardholders and retailers. Other things being
equal, cardholders generally benefit as more retailers accept their cards in
payment, and up to a point (depending, for instance, on transaction cost
efficiency), retailers as a whole benefit as card usage expands. Starting from
a zero interchange fee, therefore, there are circumstances in which retailers
in aggregate, and efficiency, would benefit from there being more holders
and users of cards; a positive interchange fee then could improve social wel-
fare by encouraging card use. There are also circumstances in which con-
sumers would benefit from there being more card-accepting retailers, and
a negative interchange fee then could be optimal. 
The general point is that the interchange fee can adjust the balance
between card acceptance and card holding/usage. In the presence of net-
work externalities—that is to say, network effects that have not been inter-
nalized—there is no presumption that the optimal interchange fee is zero.
But since network externalities can in principle go either way, neither is
there a general presumption as to the desirable direction of rebalancing,
relative to an interchange fee of zero. 
As to the desirability of using the interchange fee to tune the balance
between card acceptance and card holding/usage, it may well be that the
case is stronger in nascent systems than in mature systems with wide 
coverage.
19 In mature systems, there is no problem of viability, and any 
network externalities resulting from changes in membership on either side
of the market may be small relative to those in a nascent system. And it is
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 in mature systems with wide coverage that retailers may feel most obliged
to accept the cards of those systems—in other words, merchant resistance
is weaker. Thus the divergence between the commercial interest of the
banks and the public interest in regard to the interchange fee, as well as the
sheer volume of commerce affected, may well be greater in mature systems
with wide coverage than in newer or smaller systems.
The possible relevance of imperfect competition in card issuing (or
acquiring) is a separate point. Suppose, as was suggested earlier, that com-
petition in issuing is imperfect relative to that in acquiring. Then, along
the lines of the theoretical argument that firms with market power should
be subsidized to induce them to expand output, it could be argued that
card issuing should be subsidized via the interchange fee to offset the mar-
ket power of issuers. This is a key reason why, in the analysis of Rochet and
Tirole (2002), the socially optimal interchange fee will not necessarily be
lower than the highest level at which retailers would accept cards (which is
the commercially optimal level of the fee in their model).
However, the argument that the interchange fee should be raised in order
to subsidize imperfectly competitive issuers is unappealing.
20 First, insofar
as there is imperfect competition, it should be addressed by procompetitive
measures, not rewarded by subsidy. (Pushed to an extreme, the argument
would favor subsidizing cartels.) Second, any subsidy has to be financed by,
effectively, a tax on retail purchases. It may be that some of the tax implied
by a high interchange fee is recycled to card-paying consumers (for
instance, via the interest-free period and rewards for card use), but the recy-
cling may well be imperfect and inefficient. Moreover, there is usually no
interest-free period for the many payers by credit card who do not routine-
ly clear their balances in full, and in the absence of frictionless surcharging,
those paying other than by credit card get no tax rebate at all. So besides
the general unattractiveness of subsidizing imperfectly competitive firms,
the effective tax to finance the subsidy would seem likely itself to be inef-
ficient and distorting.
The question of surcharging deserves further comment. If surcharging
were frictionless—that is, if retailers costlessly could differentiate their retail
prices according to means of payment—then surcharges could internalize
some or even all of the externalities relating to credit card acceptance and
use.
21 In theory, there could still be public interest reasons to seek to use the
interchange fee to correct for distortions—for example, relating to issuer
market power, as discussed (doubtfully) above, or if there were a systematic
tendency for retailers to set price differentials that did not match the costs
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the practical importance of this theoretical point seems very limited.
In fact, moreover, surcharging is by no means costless for retailers, even
where (as in the United Kingdom) surcharging is permitted. In that case,
an unduly high interchange fee for credit cards could substantially distort
choice between payment methods (for example, against debit cards), with
important consequences for economic efficiency, and to the particular
detriment of the many consumers who either don’t generally pay by credit
card (perhaps because their credit rating does not allow them to have such
cards) or let costly card debt accrue. 
A public interest assessment of the interchange fee would by contrast seek
to avoid distortion between payment method choice, and would consider
consumer welfare evenly in the round, without special weight on consumers
who both generally pay by credit card and routinely clear their balances in full.
A. Commercial incentives and the public interest compared
It follows from the points discussed above that the level of the inter-
change fee that is best for the major credit card associations, and their
members, could well be significantly in excess of the level that best serves
economic efficiency and overall consumer welfare.
22 So the invisible price
set by the major credit card systems—so frequently paid in modern
economies directly by retailers and indirectly by consumers as a whole—
could well be too high, at substantial cost to the public interest.
V. PUBLIC POLICY APPROACHES
The level of the interchange fees set by the major credit card associations
is therefore a serious public policy question. In broad terms there are three
approaches to it. The first is laissez-faire, which would be the right
approach if the costs of public policy intervention outweighed the benefits.
As explained above, that may be the case for nascent or smaller systems but
is less likely for mature systems with wide coverage. As to the cost of inter-
vention, moreover, it is worth noting that there is no reason to expect that
some public policy constraint on interchange fees would require a large
regulatory apparatus.
The two broad alternatives to laissez-faire are general competition law or
specific regulatory measures—for example, in legislation relating to payments
systems. For short I will call these the “competition policy” and “regulatory”
approaches, respectively. However, a variety of substantive outcomes is 
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 possible under each of these broad headings, and so substantively, if not 
procedurally, those outcomes could overlap. For example, one could imagine
a regulatory approach that imposed a particular level of interchange fee—for
instance, zero—on the major systems. Conceivably, though I think this
unlikely, a competition law remedy could take the same form. By contrast, a
lighter-touch form of regulation might allow the relevant interchange fees to
be within a range, perhaps reflecting particular cost categories (but excluding
others), and one could imagine a competition law remedy—or settlement—
similar to that.
In part because of this possible substantive overlap, one cannot say that the
competition policy approach is generally better or worse than the regulatory
approach. But it has advantages, provided it is effective, for example by avoid-
ing the need for particular legislative or regulatory provisions or structures. 
What competition policy approaches to the interchange fee question
have been taken in the United Kingdom and at EC level? A full answer to
this question would involve, among other things, detailed discussion of
various legal points and, moreover, would be improper, given that cases are
currently in progress, including at the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). So the
following is a general and nontechnical account of what has happened to
date, focusing on some of the key issues.
A. Competition law and cases
First, the relevant law must be outlined. In broad terms, article 81 of the
EC Treaty and the chapter I prohibition of the U.K. Competition Act
1998, which mirrors EC law, prohibit appreciably anticompetitive agree-
ments, unless they are shown to pass all of four tests. More particularly, the
prohibitions apply to “agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings, or concerted practices . . . which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition.”
The tests are that the agreement (etc.) 
• must contribute to improving production or distribution or 
promoting technical or economic progress, 
• with consumers getting a fair share of the resulting benefit, and 
• must not contain restrictions not indispensable to attaining
those objectives
• nor eliminate competition.
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petition not to be prohibited, it must satisfy all of these tests in such a way
that the procompetitive advantages of the agreement outweigh any disad-
vantages to competition. 
In the United Kingdom, MasterCard notified its arrangements to the
OFT when the Competition Act came into force in 2000.
23 In February
2003, the OFT issued a statement of objections to MasterCard and pub-
lished a summary of preliminary conclusions on MasterCard’s interchange
fee.
24 Following extensive responses from MasterCard and analysis of those
responses, a further statement of objections was issued in November 2004.
That statement proposed to find that the MasterCard agreement on the
interchange fee applicable to U.K. transactions infringed article 81 of the
EC Treaty as well as the chapter I prohibition of the U.K. Competition
Act. (In May 2004, the OFT had become empowered to apply the EC
competition rules as well as domestic law.) Further extensive responses
came from MasterCard, and the OFT’s analysis of them is nearing its con-
clusion. In November 2004, the OFT also announced that it had launched
an investigation into the Visa agreement on interchange fees applicable to
U.K. transactions.
Meanwhile, in 2002, the European Commission found that the agreement
on the Visa intra-regional interchange fee, applicable to cross-border Visa
consumer card transactions in Europe, was anticompetitive but granted it an
exemption (until the end of 2007) after Visa made a number of changes to
its arrangements, including a lowering of interchange fees. The European
Commission is currently examining the MasterCard interchange fees relat-
ing to cross-border transactions, on which it issued a statement of objections
in the autumn of 2003.
25 The OFT and the European Commission, of
course, are in close contact on these matters.
26
B. Two key issues
Of the various issues that European competition law assessment of inter-
change fee arrangements in major four-party credit card systems entails,
two are central:
• The question of anticompetitiveness: Supposing that the arrangements are
“agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings, or concerted practices,” do they prevent, restrict, or distort competition?
• The question of exemptability: If the arrangements are anticompetitive, do
they pass the tests?
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 On the questions of anticompetitiveness, there are, broadly speaking, at
least two ways (either or both of) which interchange fee arrangements
might be found to be anticompetitive. The first is if it is found that the
existence of the agreed interchange fee restricts competition—perhaps
because it is found to restrict the incentive or ability of parties to negotiate
interchange fees bilaterally. 
The second is if it found that the level of the interchange fee distorts
competition in the acquiring market and/or the issuing market—for exam-
ple, by putting unduly high costs onto acquirers and thereby preventing or
restricting their ability to offer better terms to retailer customers. At what
level of the fee might there be said to be such a distortion of competition?
On one view, there might be said to be a distortion, relative to the situa-
tion of simply letting costs lie where they fall, if there are any transfers set
by card system agreements—in other words, if interchange fees are other
than zero. More generally, having regard to the fact that credit card systems
provide payment services jointly to retailers and to cardholders, it might be
thought that there is a distortion of competition in the acquiring market
arising from the interchange fee, at least if it effectively requires acquirers to
charge retailers more than their fair share of the costs of providing the pay-
ment services. But it is not obvious what constitutes a fair share. So a relat-
ed, but perhaps rather modest, view would be that there is certainly a dis-
tortion of competition in the acquiring market arising from the interchange
fee if it effectively requires acquirers to charge retailers more than all the
costs of providing the payment services that are provided jointly to retailers
and cardholders.
27 (It would then seem quite reasonable to say that there was
a scheme-imposed ‘tax’ on retailers and, hence, their customers.) Likewise,
there would be a distortion of competition in the issuing market arising
from the interchange fee if it effectively required issuers to charge cardhold-
ers more than all the costs of providing the payment services. 
On occasion, there have been attempts to justify levels of interchange
fees in terms of costs, but where those costs have included not only (all) the
costs of payment services but also the costs of credit services provided to
cardholders, for example the cost of the interest-free period. On the
approach outlined in the previous paragraph, such interchange fees would
be held to be distortive of competition.
For argument’s sake, suppose now that interchange fee arrangements
have been found to be anticompetitive. Besides the tests relating to 
economic progress and elimination of competition, arrangements with an
unduly high interchange fee might fail the tests relating to consumer share
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example, far from being indispensable to the attainment of economic
progress and consumer benefit, an unduly high fee would reduce them 
relative to situations with perfectly feasible lower fee levels. But what is an
unduly high interchange fee?
Again, perhaps a natural benchmark is whether or not the interchange
fee paid effectively by retailers (and, hence, their customers) exceeds all the
costs of the payment services that are provided jointly to retailers and card-
holders. Thus, one approach would be to say that if the interchange fee is
within this bound, then the indispensability test is met, but that otherwise
it is failed, unless it is demonstrated that such a high interchange fee—with
more than all of the payment services costs charged to one side of the mar-
ket—is necessary to attain the objectives of economic progress and con-
sumer benefit.
28
Arguably, however, such an approach would be too permissive. It is quite
possible that an interchange fee that charged all—but no more than—the
costs of payment system services to one side of the market would result in
lower economic progress and consumer benefit than a fee at, say, half that
level, or indeed at zero. Unless it could be demonstrated that such a high
fee were required to attain those objectives, it might be thought that an
interchange fee equal to all the cost of payment system services failed the
indispensability test in European competition law.
On the other hand, it might be argued that the interchange fee should,
after all, be set so high as to charge more than all the costs of payment sys-
tem services to one side of the market—the retailer side—and, in particu-
lar, that the cost of funding the interest-free period enjoyed by (some) card-
holders should be factored into it. However, besides the burden of proof,
such an argument would appear to have some difficulties to overcome,
including, but not only, the following.
First, such reasons as there are in economic theory that the most desirable
interchange fee might conceivably, in particular theoretical circumstances,
charge more than all of the payment services costs to one side of the market
appear to have nothing to do with the cost of funding an interest-free 
period (or other credit services provided to cardholders). Only by fluke
would that deliver the answer.
Second, credit card issuers have substantial revenue streams other than
the interchange fee to finance the cost of funding the interest-free period,
especially interest payments from the many who do not routinely pay off
their credit card balances in full. (For those cardholders, moreover, there is
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 usually no interest-free period anyway.) This is an element of the wider
point that it would seem natural and appropriate for the terms of credit
between issuers and cardholders to be a matter between them, not one call-
ing for financial contribution from retailers and, hence, consumers at large.
Third, the detriment caused through higher retail prices to consumers
generally would have to be shown to be outweighed by other economic and
consumer benefits.
29
The questions of anticompetitiveness and of exemptability discussed above,
though central, are but two of a number of issues that arise in the assessment
of interchange fees under competition law in Europe. The cases continue.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The first question posed at the outset was whether the invisible hand
would ensure that the invisible prices so frequently paid in modern
economies—the interchange fees of the major credit card associations—
would be set at economically efficient levels. For the reasons outlined
above, that is to be doubted.
30 Where those invisible prices are of great eco-
nomic importance—including for the evolution of payments systems—it
follows that interchange fees are potentially of serious public policy con-
cern. Perhaps they call for tailored regulation. Perhaps competition law can
provide adequate discipline. We shall see.
Author’s note: The views expressed here are personal and not necessarily those of the OFT.
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ing to debt interest, for possible divergence between commercial and social incen-
tives). In their model, the interchange fee is set too high by commercial interests
except if it is socially, as well as commercially, optimal for the fee to be at the high-
est level at which retailers accept cards. 
23Another U.K. payments systems matter involving interchange fee issues noti-
fied at roughly the same time was the agreement relating to the LINK ATM net-
work. The OFT found, in a decision issued in October 2001, that LINK’s central-
ly set merchant interchange fee restricted competition, but that it satisfied the tests
for exemption. The exemption decision applies until October 2006—see
www.oft.gov.uk/Business/Competition+Act /Decisions/LINK+Interchange+Network+
Limited.htm. The OFT is also engaged in work on payment system questions other
than interchange fees—see, for example, United Kingdom Payment Systems—An
OFT Market Study of Clearing Systems and Review of Plastic Card Networks (May
2003) and other materials at www.oft.gov.uk/Business/Payment+systems+task
+force/default.htm. 
24Office of Fair Trading (2003). A previous statement of objections had been
issued in September 2001.
25See Commission press release MEX/03/1030 of October 30, 2003.
26In addition, there are competition law cases concerning interchange fees in
some EU member states other than the United Kingdom. And there have been
and are cases, including before the European Commission, on credit card matters
other than interchange fees.
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27In those circumstances, it also reasonably might be said that there was distor-
tion of competition in the issuing market because the receipt of interchange fees
reflecting more than all of the cost of payment services unduly depressed the effec-
tive cost base of issuers—a system-imposed subsidy financed by the tax on retail-
ers and their customers. There could moreover be consequential, and very substan-
tial, distortions of competition between means of payment, for the reasons out-
lined above.
28If the only reason why the interchange fee was found to be anticompetitive
was the distortion of competition arising from its being in excess of all the costs
of payment system services, then the exemptability question would fall away if
the fee were reduced below that level, because there would no longer be anticom-
petitiveness. But that is not the only reason why an interchange fee might be
found to be anticompetitive.
29Note that this detriment is suffered by cardholders too on the typically many
occasions when they make purchases other than by credit card.
30Adam Smith, I suspect, would hardly have expected the invisible hand to guide
the major credit card associations of today as it may have done the independent
butchers, brewers, and bakers of his time. 
 JOHN VICKERS 247
REFERENCES
Evans, David, and Richard Schmalensee. 1999. Paying with Plastic: The
Digital Revolution in Paying and Borrowing, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press. 
Katz, Michael. 2001. “Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Australia II,
Commissioned Report: Network Effects, Interchange Fees, and No-sur-
charge Rules in the Australian Credit and Charge Card Industry,”
Reserve Bank of Australia, August.
Macfarlane, Ian. 2005. “Gresham’s Law of Payments,” speech to AIBF
Industry Forum 2005, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, March 23.
Office of Fair Trading. 2003. MasterCard Interchange Fees: Preliminary
Conclusions, London, OFT634, February.
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and J. Tirole. 2002. “Cooperation among
Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations,” RAND
Journal of Economics, vol. 33, pp. 549-70.
Wright, Julian. 2004. “The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in
Payment Systems,” Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 52, pp. 1-26.
 